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Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Coble, and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank
you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the Patent Reform Act of 2007. I
testify here on my own behalf, and my views are not necessarily those of any institution
with which I am associated. My testimony will focus on two of the proposed reforms: (1)
renewed emphasis upon market- based damages in the patent law, an issue commonly
known as "apportionment"; and (2) post-grant opposition proceedings, and in particular
the desirability of a "second window" period of review.

Both the reform of patent damages law and the introduction of post-grant opposition
proceedings could ameliorate two factors that contribute to the current troubles of the
U.S. patent system: Uncertainty concerning the extent and value of patent rights; and the
high licensing, litigation, and transaction costs that innovative industry must pay in order
to obtain clear answers. It is easy to understand why predictable patent rights and
valuations benefit rights holders, their competitors, and the public alike. Certainty within
the patent system allows private industry to understand the proprietary uses of individual
patented inventions, and therefore their value. Certainty also allows the patentee's
competitors to understand the degree to which they may approach the protected invention
without infringing, as well as what liability they will face when they do infringe. These
traits in turn strengthen the incentives of private actors to engage in value-maximizing
activities such as innovation or commercial transactions.

In contrast, uncertainty surrounding patent rights is said to hold deleterious
consequences. The lack of predictability creates duplicative, deal-killing transaction
costs, as potential contracting parties must revisit the work of the USPTO in order to
assess the validity of issued patents. Uncertain patent rights may also encourage activity
that is not socially productive. Attracted by large damages awards, rent-seeking
entrepreneurs may be attracted to form speculative patent acquisition and enforcement
ventures. Routine expansion of the damages base to include components that the patent
proprietor did not invent may leave the patent proprietor and accused infringer sharply at
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odds regarding the value of that infringement, thereby discouraging private settlement of
disputes. Industry participants may also be forced to expend considerable sums on patent
licensing and defensive litigation. The net results appear to be reduced rates of
innovation, decreased voluntary patent-based transactions, and higher prices for goods
and services. The Patent Reform Act of 2007 proposes numerous reforms that both
increase certainty within the patent system and lower patent-based transactions costs. It
would do so in part by increasing the predictability of the individual value of an infringed
patent and decreasing the costs of obtaining an expert determination of a patent's validity.
This testimony explores both of these issues next.

Renewed Emphasis Upon Market-Based Damages A fundamental premise of the patent
system is that the market most effectively assesses the worth of inventions.1 Reliance
upon market mechanisms allows the government to promote innovation with relatively
modest effort and expense, particularly in comparison with the rewardbased systems that
are the chief alternatives to patents.2 As Judge Giles S. Rich explained: [I]t is one of the
legal beauties of the system that what is given by the people through their governmentthe patent right-is valued automatically by what is given by the patentee. His patent has
value directly related to the value of his invention, as determined in the marketplace.

Consistent with this orientation, the patent law aspires to fix damages for infringement at
market based rates that are intended to compensate the patent proprietor for the
infringement.4 As suggested by the $1.52 billion damages award Alcatel-Lucent recently
obtained against Microsoft, evidence is mounting that judicial determinations of damages
for patent infringement have begun to exceed market rates. This problem appears to be
due in part to the combination of the increasing popularity of the patent system and the
growing sophistication of technology. In the twenty-first century, the number of issued
patents has reached a level virtually unimaginable to an earlier generation. By an order of
magnitude, the number of extant patents has never been higher than it is today.5
Contemporaneously, technologies have grown more complex. Even everyday consumer
products, ranging from cellular telephones to automobiles, commonly incorporate
hundreds or thousands of individual components. These trends have resulted in an
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environment where high technology products increasingly embody not merely a single or
handful of patented inventions, but hundreds or even thousands of them.

Within this milieu, the prospect that high technology firms must obtain licenses from
multiple patent holders in order to market their products has become a virtual certainty.
Yet case law and empirical evidence alike reveal that the courts are inclined towards
awarding damages that may far exceed an individual patent's contribution to an infringing
product. To name ten such recent cases:

In Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., the claimed invention consisted of a particular type of
"loudspeaker enclosure"-essentially a cabinet in which a stereo loudspeaker sits. In
particular, the patented loudspeaker enclosure featured a "port tube" that allowed some of
the acoustic energy inside the cabinet to be released with proper attention to phase
relationships, in order to eliminate port noise and increase bass response. When assessing
damages against an adjudicated infringer, however, the trial court allowed the royalty
base to consist of the entire loudspeaker system, rather than just the infringing port tube.

The court of appeals in Code-Alarm, Inc. v. Electromotive Technologies Corp. allowed
the value of the entire vehicle alarm system to serve as the royalty base, rather than the
single component (a motion sensor) that was patented. In Fonar Corp. v. General Elec.
Co.,9 the patented invention was limited to a specific imaging feature incorporated into
an Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) machine. The court nonetheless upheld a jury's
damages award consisting of a royalty based upon the value of an entire accused MRI
machine. The infringed patent in Hem, Inc. v. Behringer Saws, Inc.10 claimed a "feed
table," a mechanical device for moving workpieces, such as sections of wood, towards a
saw, drill, or other machine tool. The jury awarded infringement damages based not just
upon sales of feed tables, however, but upon the adjudicated infringer's sales of
unpatented saws as well.

In Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc.,11 the court of appeals affirmed the
inclusion of all of the patent proprietor's products in the royalty base, rather than merely
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the infringing image viewing system. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Newbridge Networks, Inc.
involved the infringement of a patented data networking device. With respect to damages,
the court allowed two unpatented software programs designated as 4602 and 46020 to be
included in the royalty base, even though they were not physically part of the patented
device, and were not even necessary for the patented device to operate. The Federal
Circuit overturned the damages award in Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., relating
to a microingredient weighing machine that included the patented invention. Overturning
the district court, the court of appeals authorized a royalty award based on sales of the
unpatented microingredients because it was reasonably foreseeable that the patentee
would have profited from sales of the microingredients had the infringement not
occurred.

The patentee in State Contracting & Engineering Corp. v. Condotte14 was awarded
reasonable royalties based upon the amount of an entire construction contract, rather than
merely upon the cost of the patented soundwall. In Symbol Technologies v. Proxim,15
the court awarded damages based upon a 6% royalty based upon the infringement of two
patents relating to the IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networking standard (commonly
known as WiFi). Because hundreds of issued patents and pending applications cover the
802.11 cluster of standards, the royalty obligations of any firm selling WiFi products
could be many multiples of the product's sales price. In Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso
Manufacturing Michigan Inc.,16 a suit involved a patented method and device for
balancing a fan inside an assembly, the court of appeals upheld a damages award based
upon sales of entire radiator and condenser assemblies.

Damages awards that dramatically exceed the commercial value of a patented invention
conflict with the fundamental patent law norm that the marketplace is the best evaluator
of an invention's worth. This theoretical imbalance manifests itself through a number of
deleterious practical consequences. First, excessive damages awards may promote patent
litigation. A rational patent proprietor may be unwilling to make fair royalty demands in
the boardroom when they are able to obtain significantly higher damages awards in the
courtroom. Second, the gap between the damages awarded for patent infringement and
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the marketplace value of a patented invention may also encourage speculation in patents.
So-called trolls- entrepreneurial speculators who prefer to acquire and enforce patents
rather than engage in research, development, manufacturing, or other socially productive
activity- may be animated in part by the reality that patent damages awards may exceed
profits that can be obtained in the marketplace.17 Put differently, overly generous
damages awards may encourage firms to play the patent game, rather than engage in
manufacturing, marketing, or other more socially productive activity. Third, the failure to
apportion patent damages may cause the scope of patent protection routinely to extend
beyond the scope of its claims. At times, of course, the scope of the claim does not
adequately reflect the marketplace value of the inventor's contribution, due either to claim
drafting or commercial marketing decisions. In such circumstances courts appropriately
apply the Id. at 362-63; Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits 18 in
Contemporary Patent Damages Cases, 10 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW &
TECHNOLOGY 8, at *14 (2005). See also Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1556 (Nies. J.,
dissenting) ("To constitute legal injury for which lost profits may be awarded, the
infringer must interfere with the patentee's property right to an exclusive market in goods
embodying the invention of the patent in suit. The patentee's property rights do not
extend to its market in other goods unprotected by the litigated patent.").

Entire Market Value Rule. Yet when the Entire Market Value Rule effectively becomes
the default damages principle, rather than one that applies under only particular
circumstances, the actual scope of patent protection may greatly exceed the claim scope
that has been sought and obtained. Failure to apportion damages may cause a patent
effectively to cover contributions that lie within the public domain, as well as technology
that has been patented by third parties or even by the infringer. Current patents remedies
practice too quickly disregards a host of patentability and infringement doctrinesincluding, among others, novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, claim construction, and
the doctrine of equivalents-that attempt to achieve a just balance between promoting
innovation and preserving competition.

These three factors contribute to an additional point of concern: The imposition of
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unreasonable royalty burdens upon high technology manufacturers.19 Modern products
and processes commonly embody numerous patented inventions, with some
incorporating on the order of one thousand or more. Overly generous damages awards
with respect to just a fraction of these patents may impose infringement liability upon
manufacturers that dramatically exceeds the profits the infringer made. Such an outcome
fails to recognize that the patent system serves not just to promote innovation, but also to
encourage the dissemination of new products and processes to the marketplace.

The decline of apportionment principles may also be due to an affirmative judicial desire
to award a prevailing patent proprietor supracompetitive rates as damages. Under this
rationale, although courts state that damages award are intended only to compensate
patent proprietors for the infringement, they are nonetheless sympathetic to patent
proprietors who prevail in litigation but leave the courtroom with market-oriented rates.
For example, in the influential decision in Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works,
Inc., Chief Judge Markey explained that:

Except for the limited risk that the patent owner, over years of litigation, might meet the
heavy burden of proving the four elements required for recovery of lost profits, the
infringer would have nothing to lose, and everything to gain if he could count on paying
only the normal, routine royalty non-infringers might have paid. As said by this court in
another context, the infringer would be in a "heads-I-win, tails-youlose" position.

Under this view, failure to augment damages insufficiently compensates patent
proprietors who are forced to litigate. It may also encourage infringers to refuse to license
voluntarily. The reasoning in Panduit suffers from several flaws. First, Congress has also
stipulated that prevailing patent proprietors may be entitled to the award of a permanent
injunction prohibiting future infringement. Unless the adjudicated infringer can readily
shift its manufacturing and distribution facilities to an alternative technology, the
imposition of an injunction is likely to be a costly and even fatal event for that enterprise.
The availability of an injunction provides an additional incentive for private bargaining,
regardless of the award of damages for past infringement. Second, this line of reasoning
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ignores the reality that the patent system relies upon stubborn defendants in patent cases
to weed out invalid patents. The punishment of adjudicated infringers through high
damages awards would not only discourage private efforts to maintain patent quality, it is
also inconsistent with congressional directives expressed within the Patent Act. Notably,
Congress has provided for the award of enhanced damages, as well as the award of
attorney fees in "exceptional cases." Congress is of course free to expand upon the
circumstances in which courts may award punitive damages. Notably, earlier patent
statutes called for the automatic award of punitive damages, and one bill introduced in
the 109th Congress called for the award of attorney fees to prevailing patent holders.
Absent statutory amendments, however, judicial award of punitive damages or attorney
fees through the guise of compensatory damages flies in the face of congressional intent.

As currently drafted, the damages reforms of the Patent Reform Act of 2007 appear to
apply to both measures of damages in the patent law: reasonable royalties and lost profits.
More specifically, proposed 284(a)(2) speaks specifically to reasonable royalties, while
284(a)(3) and (4) apply to all damages awards. Congress may wish to align the focus of
these provisions, either by eliminating specifically reference to reasonable royalties in
paragraph (2), or adding such a reference in paragraphs (3) and (4).

Because the identical concerns over apportionment appear to arise for both sorts of
damages calculations, application of apportionment to each methodology seems
appropriate. Congress should appreciate, however, that this reform would alter current
damages practices. Under contemporary practice, once a court has determined that the
sale made by the adjudicated infringer would have been made by the patentee, then the
patentee's entire lost profits serve as the damages base. This standard prevails even where
the patented invention serves merely as one component of a complex, multi-component
infringing product. As a leading opinion, W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Carlisle Corp.,
stated: "Once the fact that sales have been lost has been proven, there is no occasion for
the application of apportionment."

In support of its conclusion, Carlisle v. Gore explained that apportionment was
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inapplicable in lost profits cases because such awards are compensatory, rather than
equitable in nature. Under prevailing law, lost profits are to be awarded based upon sales
that the patentee would have made "but for" the infringement. Following this chain of
reasoning, once a patentee demonstrates that it would have achieved a sale absent the
infringement, then it should be entitled to the entire amount of the profit associated with
that sale. Whether the patent concerns merely a component of the infringing product is
irrelevant under this logic.

This line of reasoning holds a certain superficial appeal. After all, the adjudicated
infringer has caused an injury to the patent proprietor that the infringer could have
foreseen. Use of apportionment principles would seemingly limit the compensation of the
patent proprietor to only a portion of the injury that was suffered. It is for this reason that
some commentators have announced the "death of apportionment," at least as applied to
lost profits damages. Yet failure to apply apportionment in lost profits cases potentially
leads to the same harms that apply to damages awards based upon reasonable royalties. It
may well be the case that "but for" the infringement, the patent proprietor may have
achieved a sale. Yet the award of the entirety of lost profits for infringement of a
particular patent may effectively expand its scope of protection to incorporate inventions
claimed by other, unrelated patents. This proposition is best illustrated through an
example. Consider an industry with three participating firms, Alpha, Beta, and Gamma.
Each firm sells a product that incorporates two discrete inventions (call them X and Y).
Because the combination of X and Y implements an industry standard, products must
incorporate both inventions in order to be saleable. Further assume that Alpha owns the
'001 patent, which claims invention X, while Beta owns the '002 patent concerning
invention Y.

Under this hypothetical, if Alpha sues Gamma for infringement of the '001 patent, Alpha
should be able to recover lost profits in view of Gore v. Carlisle. Logically, "but for" the
infringement of the '001 patent, Gamma would not have been able to sell the combination
of X and Y. However, awarding the entirety of lost profits neglects the fact that Alpha's
hypothetical lost sales would also take advantage of invention Y and the proprietary
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interest established by the '002 patent. This problem is compounded from the perspective
of Gamma. Due to its infringement of the '002 patent, Gamma would be also be liable to
the full extent of Beta's lost profits. Not only does the rejection of apportionment
principles within the context of lost profits expose Gamma to doubled liability, it
effectively allows the scope of each patent to expand to include the other. This example
should not be viewed as strained or unusual. Given the numerous patents that cover a
particular products in many industries, the fact that only two patents are involved may
make this hypothetical rather understated. Apportioning lost profits damages would
ensure that the inventor's remedy is tied to his technological and economic contribution,
and not extended towards technologies that he did not invent.

The notion that patent damages should be based upon the value of the inventor's
contribution stands among the more venerable damages doctrines in all of patent
jurisprudence. In an era where apportionment concerns are more cogent than ever, courts
have treated this doctrine with surprising neglect. The resulting trend towards overly
generous damages awards may allow patentees to obtain proprietary interests in products
they have not invented, encourage litigation, promote patent speculation, place
unreasonable royalty burdens upon producers of high technology products, and ultimately
impede the process of technological innovation and dissemination that the patent system
is meant to foster. By better aligning the patent system's aspirations with its practical
workings, reinvigoration of apportionment principles may stand among the more
significant contributions by current patent reformers.

Post-Grant Opposition Proceedings

The Patent Reform Act also calls for post-grant administrative revocation proceedings,
commonly known as "oppositions." A standard feature of foreign patent systems to which
the United States usually invites comparison, oppositions provide both a less expensive
alternative to litigation and access to the legal and technical expertise of the USPTO
following the issuance of a patent. By decreasing the costs and improving the accuracy of
patent validity determinations, oppositions would appear to provide considerable benefits
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to all stakeholders within the patent system. Concerns have nonetheless been expressed
that oppositions would inject uncertainty into the proprietary rights established by
patents, without corresponding benefits to public welfare. As Congress considers this
concern, it might do well to remember that the patent system presently incorporates
several post-grant proceedings that may be triggered at any time during the life of the
patent.

One of these proceedings is termed "reissue." Under that procedure, a patent proprietor
may, at any time during the life of the patent, return to the USPTO to cancel or amend
existing patent claims; or to obtain new claims. This effort often serves as a "tune up"
prior to licensing or litigation. The reissue proceeding dates back to the early nineteenth
century, having been part of our patent system for nearly its entire existence.

Another sort post-granting proceeding is termed a reexamination.38 Reexaminations
allow anyone-the patent owner, the USPTO Director, an interested onlooker-to contest a
patent grant at In addition, the Patent Act places no time limits on the ability 39 to file a
disclaimer, 35 U.S.C. 253 (2006), or to cite prior art to the USPTO, 35 U.S.C. 301
(2006). any time during the life of the patent. The original reexamination statute dates
back to 1980, with a new, more robust version enacted in 1999. In view of these
established post-grant procedures,39 savvy patent-based decision making has long
accounted for the prospect of USPTO intervention during the term of a particular patent.
Furthermore, such intervention can occur at any time during the life of the patent.
Congress therefore may wish to evaluate claims that opposition proposals will mark a sea
change in patent practice with some care.

Congress may also wish to consider closely whether restrictive time limits upon
oppositions are appropriate. A short time limit to provoke an opposition, based upon the
date a patent issues and absent the possibility to bring this proceeding later in time, will
essentially place the entire gallery of extant patents without the opposition system.
Congress may also wish to recognize that many patents claim technologies that are ahead
of their time, and that their commercial value is not realized until many years after the

11

USPTO approve the application. This situation is commonplace for FDA-regulated
products, including pharmaceuticals and medical devices, that commonly do not obtain
marketing approval until many years after a patent granted. Should Congress wish to
establish a date certain by which to bring an opposition against patents on regulated
products, perhaps a window based upon the date of FDA marketing approval may be the
more appropriate starting point.
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